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I
INTRODUCTION
The traditional approach to protecting public-trust resources, such as
wildlife found on private lands, is predominantly regulatory and proscriptive.
Environmental regulation—such as the Endangered Species Act, Clean Water
Act, or Clean Air Act—has focused on restricting or prohibiting resource
management by landowners. However, achieving the goals of legislation
enacted to protect these resources often requires proactive landowner
cooperation, such as active habitat restoration and maintenance. With litigious
histories dogging much regulatory implementation, public agencies have tended
to rely upon court-proven formulas to enforce protections across a variety of
circumstances—even when more flexible approaches might better address
individual instances. Further, regulatory tools such as permits have specific
durations, but achieving protection of public-trust resources is not a timelimited endeavor. Rather, it is multigenerational, even perpetual, in nature.
Finally, legislation to remedy environmental harm has been very symptom- and
point-oriented, rather than addressing the root causes of undesired symptoms,
which, with natural resources, are often ecosystem based.
These contrasting needs and tools often lead to a misalignment of regulatory
goals and implementation. This is perhaps most pointed in the case of
protecting public-trust resources damaged in the course of resource
management, which affects entire habitats and ecosystems such as forests. The
regulations focusing on preventing harm to specific aspects of those habitats
and systems normally have a much narrower focus, for example, on an
individual wildlife species such as the Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis
caurina). In these cases, voluntary conservation easements on managed forests
offer a complementary tool to regulation. These working-forest conservation
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easements (WFCEs) are incentive based, perpetual, tailored to specific
properties, and guide resource management to favor public-trust resource
protection. As a complementary tool to regulation, they foster restoration and
permanent protection for listed-species habitats on private lands. As marketbased mechanisms, conservation easements also have broader applicability for
supporting payments for ecosystem services overall. When developed on
working forestlands, such easements allow for both sustainable resource
management and the protection of forest ecosystems.
WFCEs may also achieve certain goals of the Clean Air Act (CAA)1 and
state regulations, with specific relevance to mitigating biotic emissions of carbon
dioxide, the primary “greenhouse” gas of anthropocentric origin. This article
explores two case studies of WFCE utilization by the Pacific Forest Trust (PFT)
to help achieve the goals of (1) the Endangered Species Act (ESA)2 for
protection of the Spotted Owl and (2) the CAA for mitigation of carbondioxide emissions, as well as their overarching applicability as payments for
ecosystem services.
The first case study analyzes a WFCE held by PFT on the 7,200-acre van
Eck redwood forest in California. This WFCE was used as the basis for a
ninety-year Safe Harbor Agreement with the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS). The second case study addresses the mandatory use of
conservation easements in the implementation of the voluntary California state
program to mitigate global warming. The subsequent, voluntary use of
easements in the state’s regulatory climate program was driven by market
preference for the higher quality of offsets secured by conservation easements.
II
BACKGROUND: ECOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES FORESTS
POST-SETTLEMENT
When Europeans first migrated to what is now the United States over three
hundred years ago, the country’s forests looked vastly different. The average
forest was composed largely of old growth or virgin forest, apparently
undisturbed by human influence other than light fires.3 Disturbances were fire
(both “natural” and anthropogenic), weather-related (wind, freezes), and some
pests. Catastrophic fires were rare; light fires were common. Overall, intense
disturbances were relatively few and small in scale. These habitat-shaping forces
led to a suite of species dependent on older, more-stable forests with relatively
fewer and smaller-scale disturbances than the numerous, intense, and
continental-level disturbances about to impact them.
Biodiversity in these forests evolved in, and was thus dependent on,
environments with contiguous habitat and fewer disturbances. Habitats of
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671(q) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
2. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531–1537, 1537(a), 1538–1544 (West 2010).
3. GORDON G. WHITNEY, FROM COASTAL WILDERNESS TO FRUITED PLAIN (1994).
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undisturbed forests provided many niches and opportunities for specialization.
These older, more-stable forests also sequestered (that is, absorbed and stored)
vast amounts of carbon dioxide on both an annual basis and over time in large
“carbon banks.”4 Older forests store more carbon than younger ones.5 Prior to
the arrival of Europeans in the Americas, few events—wide-scale catastrophic
fires—caused the complete loss of these rich, old forests with the consequent
decay and release of roughly one-third of the stored carbon dioxide. These
forests contained some of the world’s largest carbon reservoirs.6 Globally,
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide were at roughly 280 ppm (parts
per million), a level at which they had been relatively stable for several
thousand years.7
Both the extent and composition of U.S. forests have changed dramatically
in the past three hundred years due to development, conversion to agriculture,
and multiple timber harvests. Forest area has been reduced by over thirty-three
percent.8 Many of the most productive lowland forests have been converted to
agricultural land. The vast majority—over seventy-five percent—of U.S. forests
today are under one hundred years of age, subject to regular intensive
disturbances from industrial forest management.9 About ten percent of U.S.
forests are one hundred to two hundred years of age, and less than five percent
are true, relatively undisturbed old growth (over two hundred years of age).10
These latter age classes exist in national parks and wilderness areas. With the
exception of relatively small areas in parks and wilderness, these forests have
become significantly fragmented. In addition, fire regimes have been
substantially altered, with catastrophic fire replacing frequent, low-intensity
fires. Pests and disease are far more common, and exotic pests and diseases
(many of which are invasive) have been transported in large numbers to this
country.
There are two related outcomes of this upheaval in our forests: The first is
the release of enormous pulses of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and the
second is the collapse of many species.11 The suite of species that evolved to live
in the relatively stable and extensive forests of 250 years ago is highly
challenged to live in these new conditions. Further, due to both the overall
levels of emissions and the cycling time of carbon, the net concentrations of
4. Sebastian Luyssaert et al., Letter, Old-Growth Forests as Global Carbon Sinks, 455 NATURE
213, 213 (2008).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 215.
7. RAJENDRA K. PACHAURI & ANDY REISINGER, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 37 (2007).
8. W. BRAD SMITH ET AL., FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GTR-NC-241, FOREST
RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at 1 (2004).
9. See id.
10. Id. at 60–63.
11. See generally Henrik Hartmann, Will a 385 Million Year-Struggle for Light Become a Struggle
for Water and for Carbon?—How Trees May Cope with More Frequent Climate Change-Type Drought
Events, 17 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 642 (2011).
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atmospheric carbon dioxide have significantly increased to over 370 ppm
today.12 Scientists fear this level could be a “tipping point” leading to major
instabilities in the global climate.13
Two unrelated federal regulatory laws, the ESA and the CAA, and one
state law, California’s Global Warming Solutions Act,14 are responses to the
consequences of forest loss, fragmentation, and depletion. These laws do not
address, however, the root causes of these outcomes. Further, both federal and
state laws rely largely on two tools: (1) setting the threshold limits of behavior
by which one can continue to operate and (2) establishing the punitive
consequences of not meeting those threshold standards. Neither the federal nor
state regulatory approaches embody significant tools to remedy the harm of
past actions that drove the regulatory requirements in the first place, nor do
they establish rewards for excellence.
WFCEs have utility in directly addressing the precipitating causes of species
extinction and major releases of carbon-dioxide emissions. They prevent forest
loss overall and reduce fragmentation and depletion by providing direct
financial compensation to compete with the financial drivers of these causes.
Further, through compensation, WFCEs can foster the restoration of conditions
in older, more-natural forests that provide desired habitat and store more
carbon. In these ways, conservation easements provide a complementary tool to
regulation.
III
THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ACTS
While there is a history of public lament for the change in our natural
environments, from Thoreau to Muir to Carson, the public responded most
strongly in the 1960s and 1970s with the advent of the historic era of
environmental regulation to protect public-trust resources of clean water, clean
air, and wildlife. Following the landmark passage of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,15 came the ESA in 1973, the Clean Water
Act of 1972,16 and major modifications to the initial CAA in 1963,17 and its
subsequent amendments in 1970,18 1977,19 and 1990.20 The public wanted strong
12. PACHAURI & REISINGER, supra note 7.
13. James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN
ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 225–26 (2008); Harold Mooney et al., Biodiversity, Climate Change, and
Ecosystem Services, 1 CURRENT OPINION ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 46 (2009).
14. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 488 (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–
38599 (West Supp. 2010)).
15. Pub. L. No. 01-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4335, 4341–
4346, 4346a, 4346b, 4347 (2006)).
16. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281a, 1294–1297
(2006)).
17. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
18. Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 2–11a, 12–15(a), (c), 84 Stat. 1676–1713 (1970) (codified as amended in
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protections against the sometimes flagrant pollution and destruction of public
resources in the course of corporations and landowners “doing business”—that
is, using methods that produce the greatest short-term return, but then often
foisting the costs of environmental harm onto future generations, future
landowners, or the public generally. Accordingly, the laws took a “command
and control” approach to regulation. Many in the regulated community
characterize these laws as a “blunt hammer” approach. They have nonetheless
been effective in addressing the most egregious practices and changing the way
business is done to better protect public-trust resources and human health.
More recently, because public awareness about the risks of global warming
has grown, there have been significant efforts at both the state and federal level
to again develop such landmark legislation to address global warming. While
federal legislation is currently stalled, there is action at both the state and global
level to mitigate global warming. California is currently the only state in the
United States to have comprehensive, economy-wide climate legislation: The
Global Warming Solutions Act.21 However, ten states participate in the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast;22 seven states and four
Canadian provinces participate in the Western Climate Initiative,23 and there is
a Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord as well.24 In addition, several
other states have passed their own “Global Warming Solutions Acts,” including
Massachusetts and Maryland.25
A. Shortcomings of Command and Control
These regulatory acts have served to stave off the imminent demise of many
species, and effectuated the elimination or substantial remediation of many
sources of air and water pollution. As such, these laws have produced many of
their desired outcomes. However, while they have been largely effective in the
prevention of undesirable actions, they have not served to achieve other
outcomes that are dependent on the promotion of desired actions. The ESA, for
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
19. Pub. L. No. 95-95, tit. I–IV, 91 Stat. 685–796 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
20. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671q
(West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West Supp. 2010).
22. RGGI, Inc., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011).
23. WCI Provincial and State Partner Contacts, WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://
www.westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-partners (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
24. Ken Paulman, Midwest Cap and Trade: Not Dead, Just Sleeping, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2011/03/04/midwest-cap-and-trade-is-it-dead-orno/.
25. See, e.g., Climate Protection and Clean Economy Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 21N §§ 1–9
(2008); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Act of 2009, MD. CODE ANN. ENVIR. §§ 2-1201 to 21211 (West 2009). These statutes do not encompass the entire economy of each state, however,
differentiating them from the California Global Warming Solutions Act, which mandates an economywide emissions cap.
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example has prevented the extermination of the San Francisco Bay
Checkerspot Butterfly (Euphydryas editha bayensis), but has effectuated very
little habitat restoration on private lands where they throve.26 In some instances,
the ESA has even incentivized the actual destruction of potential habitat: In the
South, fear of ESA land-use restrictions has lead to the preemptive destruction
of Red-Cockaded Woodpecker (Picoides borealis) habitat on private lands.27
This situation is unfortunately repeated across many species because the
ESA lacks the tools to incentivize the proactive restoration of habitat for suites
of species on anywhere near the scale needed. Similarly, while the CAA has the
tools to largely prevent the current emission of pollutants, it does not have the
provisions to deal with the legacy of historic pollution on the scale necessary.
As with toxic chemicals in landfills, the excess carbon dioxide in our
atmosphere will require active removal in order to achieve levels that are
considered “safe,” that is, below 350 ppm.28 This issue will become even more
pointed, as the CAA is now being invoked to deal with both accumulated
excess biotic emissions of carbon dioxide as well as anthropocentric carbondioxide emissions, including most notably the consumption of fossil fuels over
the past several hundred years.
B. Additional Tools: Conservation Easement Incentives
These regulatory acts were, and are, essentially powerful hammers that
could be used as threats to curb certain behaviors. However, they were not
designed to engage the private-landowner collaboration so essential to
achieving proactive restoration on the scale needed for species or natural
systems to thrive. These federal acts lose much of their impact when employed
to deal with issues governing resource management and development on
private lands. For example, real-estate development and forestry are primarily
the purview of state (and sometimes local) agency regulation and control. With
roughly sixty percent of forests privately owned, this poses a significant
deficiency in the ability of federal regulators to respond to environmental
problems stemming from private-land management.29
A further complication can occur when species that are protected under the
ESA find and then use desirable habitats that result from a landowner’s
beneficial-management practices. The landowner’s management is then subject
to approval under the ESA, when, in the absence of these species, it had not
been. This can cause significant expenditure of both money and time to ensure
compliance with the ESA, even though the actions undertaken have been

26. Ellen McGarrahan, Much-Studied Butterfly Winks out on Stanford Preserve, 275 SCIENCE 479
(1997).
27. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered
Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003).
28. Hansen et al., supra note 13, at 217.
29. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FS-874, INTERIM UPDATE OF THE 2000 RENEWABLE
RESOURCES PLANNING ACT ASSESSMENT 20 (2007).
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beneficial. This perverse outcome has sometimes been dubbed the “let no good
deed go unpunished” provision. While the ESA has been modified to allow for
Safe Harbor provisions to protect landowners from liability under these
circumstances,30 it nonetheless imposes significant scrutiny and substantial
expenses on landowners in the effort to ensure that no harm comes to these
listed species.31
By focusing on land stewardship and utilizing the powerful incentive of
conservation easements, private voluntary land trusts—which focus on land
stewardship and utilizing the powerful incentive of conservation easements—
have the potential to be highly significant in accomplishing the desired goals of
federal regulatory acts, above and beyond the observance of their proscriptive
requirements. The flexible structure, incentive character, and permanent nature
of conservation easements present a solid complement to the more inflexible,
limit-oriented, and time-limited nature of regulatory tools.
IV
CASE STUDIES IN FOREST RESTORATION AND CONSERVATION
PFT works with willing landowners, from families to corporations (for
example, members of Timber Investment Management Organizations), to
develop permanent, qualified conservation easements on managed forestland.
These forests are held and managed for economic return as well as, in some
cases, recreational and legacy purposes. The easements provide financial
incentives to landowners to hold their forests longer, leave more structure after
harvest, and provide for a more-complex native forest. The economic value of
leaving more trees on the land for longer periods of time is appraised, and this
value is returned to landowners either directly in the purchase of the
conservation easement, through tax benefits, or a combination thereof.32 The
overall impact of these WFCEs is to make natural and environmentally
beneficial management more competitive economically with short-term,
intensive forestry. The easements effectively pay for the trees left in the forest
to grow longer or not be harvested at all, such as in additional stream or
wetland buffers. The payments make up the difference in value that more
intensive forestry removes from the landscape. Hence, these easements directly
address and remove a key barrier—the time value of money—for landowners to
manage the kinds of forests that both provide for threatened and endangered
species and store more carbon, providing for real public benefit.33 Table 1
30. David S. Wilcove & Joon Lee, Using Economic and Regulatory Incentives to Restore
Endangered Species: Lessons Learned from Three New Programs, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 639,
640 (2004). For an explanation of habitat conservation planning, see Michael J. Bean & David S.
Wilcove, Editorial, The Private-Land Problem, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1 (1997).
31. See generally Robert Innes et al., Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on
Private Lands, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 35.
32. See generally John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land
Preservation, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 319 (1996).
33. Laurie Wayburn, The Van Eck Forest, in CONSERVATION CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAS 177, 183
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illustrates how WFCEs provide complementary benefits to other regulatory
approaches, expanding the net benefit for species as well as agencies and
landowners.

(James N. Levitt ed., 2010).
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Table 1: Endangered-Species Conservation Incentives:
Decision Support Matrix: Overview of Desired Outcomes and Potential
Tools to Achieve Them
Outcomes

Tool: WFCE
only

Tool: HCP
only

Tool: WFCE
& SHA

Tool: WFCE
& Sect. 7

Broad resource
protection

High:
targeted to
habitat/ecosystem

Low: targeted
to specified
species

High

High

Prevents
property
fragmentation

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Incidental-take
authorization

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Timeframe

+/- 1 year

Min. 2 years

Min. 1 year

+/- 1 year

Durability of IT
authorization

N/A

Negotiable,
based on
terms

Long term,
based on CE

Long term,
based on CE
management

“No surprises”
assurance

N/A

Yes*

Yes*

No

Public comment

No

Yes

Yes

No

NEPA review

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Breadth of
species
coverage

N/A

Broad: listed
and unlisted
possible

Broad: listed
and unlisted
possible

Limited:
listed species
only

Cost for Agency

N/A

High

Medium

Low

Cost for
Landowner

Low

High

Medium

Low

Mitigation
requirement

N/A

Yes

No: net
conservation
benefit

No: only
minimize

Compensation
to Landowner

Yes

Not for
required
mitigations

Yes

Yes

* “No Surprises” Rule available for HCP or SHA for covered species.
HCP stands for Habitat Conservation Plan.
SHA stands for Safe Harbor Agreement.
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A. Case Study #1: The ESA
Working with a number of landowners to help manage their forests for
restoration of older, more-natural conditions, PFT wanted to ensure that these
landowners were not caught in the perverse “let no good deed go unpunished”
situation. State and federal regulatory authorities have obligations via the
federal ESA34—and in many instances, state-level endangered-species acts, such
as in California and New York—to prevent harm to listed species on private
lands. Because the listed species were likely to return to these landowners’
conserved properties, PFT realized that agencies would become more involved
in the management of these lands in the near future. For example, once owls
are present, the regulating agency has the capacity to halt timber harvest until
they are satisfied that no harm to the listed species will occur. This can be
financially harmful to landowners.
PFT was specifically concerned with the habitat of the Northern Spotted
Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina), a species causing much controversy in the
1990s throughout the Pacific Northwest. These birds are highly dependent on
old forests with significant tree canopy that provide cover from predators and
large dead trees that serve as habitat for its prey. These were precisely the kinds
of forest conditions a number of PFT landowners were restoring and
maintaining.
PFT’s conservation easements already restricted management of the forests
substantially compared to what was allowable by law. The typical restrictions
required by the ESA habitat conservation plans could pose significant hardships
for these landowners.35 PFT felt that there should be some opportunity to use
the benefits of the conservation easement for the wildlife it supported, and
specifically in meeting the requirements of the ESA for Spotted Owls. Hence,
PFT initiated conversations with the USFWS on this opportunity conceptually
in the late 1990s. Although the USFWS was sympathetic and was open to the
notion, no owls had as yet returned to any of the lands protected by PFT
conservation easements. Therefore, there was not an actual case to present.
Then, from 2000 through 2001, PFT worked with Fred van Eck, and
subsequently his trust, to establish conservation easements on 9,400 acres of
managed forests that he owned in California and Oregon.36 Mr. van Eck had
multiple purposes for this ownership, but the primary one was economic. The
forests were part of a diversified portfolio of investments. Mr. van Eck felt that
forests, when well-managed, would provide consistent, long-term returns that
increased over time and served as a hedge against inflation and short-term
market variability, a belief shared by many investors.37 He also recognized that
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006).
35. See Bean & Wilcove, supra note 30.
36. Personal communications between Laurie Wayburn and Fred van Eck (2000); personal
communications between Laurie Wayburn and J. Graham (2001–02).
37. Katherine Burton & Matthew Keenan, Investors Are Turning Timberland into Gold,
MARKETPLACE by Bloomberg, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 6, 2006, at 23.
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older forests produced a larger volume of harvestable wood, and higher-quality
wood products, than younger forests produced. An avid birder, Mr. van Eck
also wanted his forests managed consonant with his conservation interests,
especially for biodiversity. His forest management embodied these goals, and
he wanted this perpetuated. Although Mr. van Eck died before he could
effectuate his wishes, his estate completed conservation easements on his
working forests.
Reflecting Mr. van Eck’s belief that economic and ecologic returns could be
synergistically maximized, these twin aspects were embodied in the
conversation easement, both in its overarching Performance Goal38 and in the
specific terms. Notably, the Performance Goal, as follows, sets very specific
requirements for the structure and composition of the forest, describing the
complex habitat to be managed for and achieved over time in the canopy, midand shrub layers of the forest.
1. Management Performance Goal
Consistent with the purposes of this easement, it is the intent of forest management
undertaken by Grantor to restore and maintain through time the late seral to mature,
complex native coastal redwood ecosystem. This forest exhibits a high degree of
spatial and temporal scale heterogeneity in habitat structure and species composition,
with variation exhibited through time, from stand to stand and from acre to acre, and
is generally characterized by the following:
a. A mix of dominant tree species including redwood (Sequoia sempervirens), Douglas
fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii), grand fir (Abies grandis), western hemlock (Tsuga
heterophylla), and Sitka spruce (Picea sitchensis), and, to a lesser extent, western red
cedar (Thuja plicata), with associated species including tanoak (Lithocarpus
densiflora), red alder (Alnus rubra), big leaf maple (Acer macrophyllum), and vine
maple (Acer circinatum). Redwood comprises over 75% over the conifer component,
with other conifers comprising the remainder, although at times, Sitka spruce may rise
to 25%. As these forests increase in age, composition is expected to shift to an
increase of redwood, western red cedar and Douglas fir, with a corresponding decline
in representation of grand fir, Sitka spruce and hemlock. The stocking target for these
forests is a minimum of 100,000 board foot per acre. The tree understory is typically
dominated by redwood and hemlock. Canopy in the overstory may attain 100%
representation of redwood. Shrub and herb layers vary according to local site
conditions, particularly moisture regime; at the drier end of the spectrum, the shrub
layer is densely dominated by salal (Gaultheria shallon), ocean spray (Holodiscus
discolor), and Oregon grape (Berberis nervosa), and the herb layer is very sparse. At
the wetter end, the shrub layer is dominated by salmon berry (Rubus spectabilis). On
moderately wet sites, sword fern (Polystichum munitum) and red huckleberry
(Vaccinium parvifolium) make up most of the herb and shrub layers.
Riparian areas are dominated by the same species that occur in the contiguous
forest, though with a greater representation of red alder, at up to 30%, and big leaf
maple at 15%, of total composition;
b. A multi-story canopy of variable densities but generally with no less than 80%
closure, allowing for gaps occurring due to natural disturbances, mortality and timber
harvesting;

38. Deed of Conservation Easement by the Fred M. Van Eck Forest Trust and the Pacific Forest
Trust, Inc. (on file with author) [hereinafter Van Eck Conservation Easement].
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c. A range of age classes, from 1 to over 600 years, to be achieved over time and
occurring heterogeneously across the property, with 25% of the inventory in the over
200 year classes; 50% of the inventory in the 80–200 year classes, and 25% in the 1–80
year classes;
d. An average of 15 dominant conifers 36” diameter at breast height (dbh) or greater
per acre, distributed throughout the forest area in a heterogeneous pattern with at
least 6 of these conifers exceeding 48” dbh; and
e. Sufficient volumes of standing dead trees, down logs and large woody debris on the
forest floor as is commonly found in late seral redwood forests. This will typically be at
least four standing snags per acre of at least 30” dbh, with an average of 1,600 cubic
feet of down and rotten logs per acre, all averaged out over any ten acres.
f. These late seral to mature forest characteristics are more particularly described in
39
Appendix A of the Report.

2. Habitat Impact for Listed Species
Key to these conservation easements was the requirement that management
restore later seral stages and develop a forest structure that resembled the
natural condition of the redwood forests. Not only would this restore and
maintain a far greater volume of harvestable, high-quality timber over time, it
would also provide critical habitat for a number of species of concern in the
region, and most specifically for the Northern Spotted Owl. This later seralstage habitat is largely lacking on private lands, and, despite Redwood National
Park and several state parks, private ownership dominates the redwood region.40

39. Id.
40. See CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY AND FIRE PROT., CALIFORNIA’S FORESTS AND RANGELANDS:
2010 ASSESSMENT (2010), http://frap.fire.ca.gov/assessment2010.html.

7 WAYBURN_PAGINATED

Fall 2011]

10/4/2011

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AS TOOLS

187

Figure 1: Aerial photograph of the four tracts composing the van Eck
forests (PFT)

The van Eck forests have become an island of relatively natural, older
forests in a sea of younger, industrially managed lands and growing
development. The van Eck forests, with their closed canopy of larger trees, now
present a haven for Spotted Owls. Indeed, they are being managed for this
outcome with a requirement of eighty-percent canopy cover to be developed
and maintained over time.41 By 2006, a Spotted Owl responded to survey calls
on the van Eck.42 While it was a single bird, with no evidence of any mate or
nesting activity, it signaled that the management was successful in its “build it
and they will come” approach. This was the beginning of what would become
an “activity center” in the language of the USFWS,43 meaning that ESA
requirements would need to be addressed shortly.
In protecting Spotted Owls on private lands, the standard approach of the
USFWS is primarily designed to modify intensive, industrial management. This
approach reserves the forest area where an owl is present from all harvest, and
establishes significant “buffer areas” of suitable habitat. These “no cut”
provisions endure as long as an owl is present, and then for three years after the
nest is abandoned—in case a bird returns or other birds occupy this area. These

41. Van Eck Conservation Easement.
42. Van Eck Conservation Easement.
43. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PROTOCOL FOR SURVEYING PROPOSED MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITIES THAT MAY IMPACT NORTHERN SPOTTED OWLS (2011).
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provisions include an eighteen-acre no-cut buffer around any existing activity
center (an “owl circle”), plus any prior activity center for three years postoccupation; they also include maintaining nesting habitat for another eighteen
acres,44 and then maintaining suitable habitat for owls in two layers for another
1,336 acres.45 These provisions are designed to prevent “take” or “harm” to the
species and to provide an undisturbed area for the nesting pair. Effectively, they
also remove and diminish harvest on up to thousands of acres. They are not
designed to promote active management or restore nesting, fledging, and
foraging habitat of the species; rather, they are designed to constrain and
modify typical clear-cut forestry.
For the van Eck forests, however, with significant portions already removed
from harvest activity via the easement provisions, and, more importantly, with
easement provisions mandating management to specifically restore desired
conditions, such an approach would be cost prohibitive. It was also unnecessary.
Of all the requirements for Spotted Owl protection, the most important are
the maintenance of canopy cover and the reduction of disturbance at the nest
site.46 The no-cut restrictions are designed to provide for consistent canopy
cover near the nest site of the owls, protecting them from predation when they
go in and out of the nest.47 This is especially relevant to the Barred Owl (Strix
varia), which is notorious for its ability to kill Spotted Owls when they emerge
from cover into the many large clearings created by intensive harvest. The van
Eck easement already required development and maintenance of eightypercent canopy cover across the entire ownership.
The USFWS biologists and management knew generally about conservation
easements—primarily for their role in permanently protecting land from
subdivision or development. They recognized this as a major benefit and one
that neither the ESA’s habitat conservation plans nor Safe Harbor Agreements
accomplished. They also recognized the value of having perpetual conservation
easements attached to the deeds for specific properties, rather than having
agreements that can be abandoned. They were not familiar, however, with an
easement’s use in guiding or restricting forest management. As such, the
USFWS biologists and management had an initial desire to use many of their
standard ESA restrictions. This would have imposed a prohibitive and
unnecessary overlay to the conservation easement.
After much discussion concerning the key provisions of the easement in the
Performance Goal, which required both the restoration and maintenance of the
preferred habitat for Spotted Owls, the USFWS and the State of California

44. See, e.g., DRAFT HEADWATERS HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN/SUSTAINABLE YIELD PLAN:
NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL CONSERVATION PLAN 20 (1998), available at http://resources.ca.gov/
headwaters/hcp/v4/v4pc.pdf.
45. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 14, § 919.9 (2011).
46. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2010 DRAFT REVISED RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE
NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (STRIX OCCIDENTALIS CAURINA) (2010).
47. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 14, § 919.9 (2011).
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agreed that the easement provided the essential basis for a ninety-year Safe
Harbor Agreement,48 the longest agreement available. The conservation
easement was incorporated by reference and was included as an appendix to the
agreement. While everyday operations remained largely unchanged, three
specific limitations were added to those of the conservation easement: (1) a
prohibition on the harvest of any actual nest tree; (2) the delineation of 6.5acre, no-cut buffer at an existing activity center and one potential future center;
and (3) a two-acre, no-cut buffer on any additional sites.
The USFWS determined that the conservation easement would be an
effective basis for granting incidental-take permission—where harm occurs
inadvertently to the species in the course of undertaking management, which is
allowed under the permit. Additional factors that were taken into account in
this determination were the specific harvest restrictions, which are the side bars
for the Performance Goal,49 and PFT’s standard enforcement provisions. The
key harvest-restriction provisions are as follows:
Specific Restrictions on Commercial Timber Harvest:
a. Waterbody, Watercourse and Riparian Forest Management Zones (WRMZs): A
200-foot slope distance WRMZ buffer zone shall be maintained along each side of all
year-round fish-bearing streams, measured from the annual high water mark; and a
100-foot slope distance WRMZ buffer zone shall be maintained along each side of
intermittent streams with flows that support aquatic life, measured from the annual
high water mark; trees may be cut in these zones pursuant to a riparian habitat
restoration and maintenance plan approved by Grantee.
b. Opening size and extent: Forest openings created through timber harvest shall not
exceed one-half (.5) acres in size for each opening, except for restoration purposes
where non-native species or species composition occur. In such cases, openings shall
not exceed 2.5 acres. In a ten year period, openings so created shall not comprise more
than 10% of the forest area of the Property in aggregate.
c. Minimum leave stand: After any timber harvest, the leave stand for that harvest unit
shall contain a distribution of native tree species consistent with the site and the
Performance Goal of this Easement, with a preponderance of such leave trees to be
windfirm, with full crown and able to promote regeneration of trees with high quality
genetic characteristics; provided, however, that an appropriate portion of dead and
dying trees shall be left so as to be distributed around the Property for habitat.
d. Maximum harvest volumes: Timber harvests may not remove more than 15% per
decade of net merchantable forest inventory as measured in Scribner short log board
foot volume or similar system per decade, or 50% of growth, whichever is greater.
After stocking achieves an average of 70,000 board foot/acre, harvest may not remove
more that 15% of inventory per decade. Merchantable forest inventory shall be
defined to include trees greater than or equal to ten inches (10”) dbh and shall utilize
a standard methodology acceptable to Grantee that provides a confidence level of
ninety percent (90%) or better for the sample. A reinventory shall occur every ten
(10) years, unless Grantor and Grantee mutually agree that such reinventory is
unnecessary for a specific decade.

48. Matt Baun, Arcata FWO: Landmark Van Eck Forest Safe Harbor Agreement to Benefit
Northern Spotted Owls, Journal Entry to Fish & Wildlife Journal, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (May
12, 2009), http://www.fws.gov/arsnew/print/print_report.cfm?arskey=26073.
49. Van Eck Conservation Easement.
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e. Steep slopes and high erosion areas: Timber harvests are prohibited in areas of
severe erosion potential.
f. Set asides: No timber harvesting shall occur within certain sensitive habitat areas as
shall be mutually agreed with Grantor, and then identified in the Report. These areas
shall be initially inventoried and designated within five years of the date of this
easement, with periodic review over time.
g. Catastrophe: In the event of catastrophic wildfire, windstorm, insect infestation, or
other natural catastrophe, Grantor may exceed these harvest levels, with the prior
approval of Grantee, provided that such proposed harvest is shown to be consistent
with the Performance Goal above and the purposes, terms and conditions of this
Easement. After a timber harvest predicated on a catastrophic event, Grantor shall
reforest with native species as necessary during the planting season following harvest.
50
The forest inventory and the forest management plan shall be updated accordingly.

The USFWS also recognized that there was adequate and sufficient financial
guarantee that PFT would be able to enforce and steward the easement over
time. Hence, management on the forests, which annually removes over onemillion board feet of timber, and expects this to double in the next forty years,
has been able to continue as planned. This provides operational certainty for
the landowner.
The net beneficial result of this agreement is many fold over that of
adopting the typical approach for gaining incidental-take permission. The
species gained permanent protection from the conservation easement. In PFT,
the USFWS now has an enforcement partner who is in regular contact with the
landowner—something USFWS personnel are hard pressed to accomplish. The
landowner received recognition for the stewardship they were providing and
faced reduced requirements compared with typical incidental-take permissions.
The easement confers financial value for its restrictions, as opposed to standard
ESA tools, which do not. Finally, in the USFWS, PFT gained a partner in
ensuring effective enforcement of easement forest-management provisions,
providing additional resources if ever these may be needed.
B. Case Study #2: Climate Benefits of Working-Forest Conservation
Easements; The California Global Warming Solutions Act and Clean Air
Act
In addition to their habitat and listed-species benefits, older, more-natural,
and more-complex forests have significant climate benefits; they sequester more
carbon dioxide than younger forests.51 These older, more natural forest systems
are also more resistant and resilient to a variety of natural disturbances, such as
fire, that can result in substantial carbon emissions. The loss of virgin and older
second-growth forests has been, and remains, the second-largest source of
human-caused carbon-dioxide emissions, responsible for a third of all

50. Id.
51. Luyssaert et al., supra note 4.

7 WAYBURN_PAGINATED

Fall 2011]

10/4/2011

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AS TOOLS

191

anthropogenic emissions since 1850.52 Unlike other sources of carbon emissions,
forests have the ability to reabsorb the carbon emitted from them as they grow.
Thus, the conservation, management, and restoration of older forests is a potent
tool for mitigating global warming.
As California began developing its first voluntary efforts to combat global
warming in 2000,53 PFT wanted to ensure that the role of forests in that effort
was properly recognized and incentivized. This recognition occurred through
legislation signed in 2002.54 The bill included not only the integration of forests
into the state’s voluntary program to address global warming, it also required
the development of rules, or protocols, for carbon-emissions-reduction projects
implemented with forests. Three types of emissions-reductions projects were
recognized: (1) managing California forests for greater net carbon stocks than
that required by law and feasible in practice, (2) restoring forests on historic
forest soils, and (3) avoiding the loss or conversion of forests to a non-forest
condition (that is, agriculture or development). The bill further required that
such projects be secured with qualifying conservation easements and utilize
natural-forest management—management that promotes and maintains forest
types found naturally in California. This was to ensure that the forests, and by
extension their climate benefits, were to be permanently protected, were more
likely to adapt to climate change than non-native forests, and that no
conversion of natural forests to exotic, non-native forests would be perversely
promoted.

52. Jeanine M. Rhemtulla et al., Historical Forest Baselines Reveal Potential for Continued Carbon
Sequestration, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6082, 6082 (2009).
53. Act effective Sept. 30, 2000, 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1018 (West) (repealed 2006).
54. Act effective Sept. 9, 2002, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 423 (West) (repealed 2006).
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Figure 2: Generalized Forest Carbon Stores over Time

The use of conservation easements was a requirement of the first climate
legislation. Their use conveyed to the public a sense of quality, as well as real
risk reduction and permanence to the projects. It was also a major incentive for
conservation, and recognized that the root cause of forest loss and depletion
was the greater economic return derived from conversion for development, as
well as the short-term return from frequent, intensive harvests. The legislation
was designed to specifically embody incentives to encourage landowners to
undertake conservation easements with their inherent financial benefits, and
then qualify for additional economic return from sales of carbon-emissions
reductions.
This did occur with a number of landmark sales of such emissions reductions
or carbon-reduction tons (CRTs). The first major commercial transactions of
domestic, forest-based carbon-emission reductions were from the van Eck
forests in 2008.55 This was followed rapidly by many other projects.56 Over forty
projects across the country were developed under this program.57 While other
carbon-emissions projects were developed under other voluntary systems,58
55. CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, http://www.climateactionreserve.org/how/projects/ (last visited
Jan. 5, 2011).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/ (last visited Mar.
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CRTs developed under the California program commanded a substantial
premium, delivering between ten and one hundred times the price of other
CRTs.59 Buyers, both direct-end users and emissions traders, responded well to
the quality of the California CRTs—specifically to the permanence, risk
reduction, and overall assurance conveyed by the conservation easements.60
The provision requiring conservation easements in this voluntary program
sunset, however, after five years. The voluntary program was then replaced by
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,61 which called for the
nation’s first economy-wide comprehensive legislation regulating globalwarming gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide. This program did not have a
specific requirement for conservation easements. The two most significant
reasons were (1) that the costs of requiring a conservation easement on all
projects would inherently limit the number of projects because funding for
easements is limited and (2) that conservation easements are not suitable for all
landowners who might want to undertake meaningful carbon-emissions
reduction projects.
Another complicating factor was that the Act was being implemented by the
California Air Resources Board,62 which does not have explicit authority to
regulate forest management, but rather air quality.63 This is a factor that also
plays into the application of the CAA to regulate carbon emissions, in which
the Environmental Protection Agency has limited authority to regulate forest
management.64 While there is precedent for federal regulation of private-forest
management, such as through control of nonpoint source pollution under the
CWA or through control of real-estate development under the Wild & Scenic
Rivers Act including along the Columbia Gorge in Washington and Oregon,
there is also historic precedent that private forest and land development are
generally regulated by states and counties, rather than the federal government.65
However, an interesting buyer preference for carbon-emissions reduction
projects secured by conservation easements emerged under the voluntary
program which persisted into the pre-compliance program and the regulatory
program of California. Projects across the nation that qualify for offset credit
under the California program are secured by conservation easements. This
appears to be driven by two practical issues, one concerning the sellers, and the
other concerning the buyers of CRTs. With the growing regulatory market for

7, 2011).
59. Personal communication between Laurie Wayburn and C. Best (2010).
60. Id.
61. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 488 (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–
38599 (West Supp. 2010)).
62. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(f)–(h).
63. Id. § 38510.
64. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183
(1995).
65. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003).
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CRTs in California and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) states,
both direct emitters, whose emissions are limited under the emissions cap, and
emissions traders have engaged in increasing market activity.
Landowners recognize that perpetual easements return significant financial
benefit, and if the projects require rolling one-hundred-year commitments for
successive annual “vintages” or yields of CRTs (which they do under both the
Climate Action Reserve voluntary program and the regulatory programs in
both California and RGGI),66 one may as well get paid for that functional
equivalent of perpetuity. Additionally, their CRTs command higher prices.
Buyers express a preference for these projects because they convey more
quality and appeal to consumers. The additional protection and permanence of
the easements reduce the risk that there will ever be a default on the projects.67
It remains to be seen what action will be taken concerning climate
regulation at the federal level in the future, be it via the CAA or by some as yet
unknown future legislation. Forests currently reduce U.S. emissions of carbon
dioxide by over thirteen percent.68 Further, they have the capacity to absorb at
least twenty-five percent more than they currently do; thus the role of forests in
any climate program is essential.69 That said, the use of easements to
permanently protect the forestland base as a critical carbon sink for the nation
is likely to remain voluntary. This poses a compelling argument to increase
public support for the acquisition of WFCEs to mitigate global warming
directly. Any eventual national carbon market could then supplement this
protection.
V
DISCUSSION
These are examples of new applications of conservation easements in the
regulatory environment, above and beyond their application in achieving a
particular landowner or land trust’s goals for traditional open-space or habitat
protection. In the case of application to the ESA, there seems to be a fairly wide
applicability of the tool to complement agency efforts, as long as the land trust
involved has the requisite skills and capacities in resource management and
stewardship. In the case of achieving climate policy goals, it appears that there
is a strong utility—at least in meeting consumer demands and in gaining greater
financial return for landowners by augmenting potential carbon revenues and
66. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA CAP ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND MARKETBASED COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CALIFORNIA GLOBAL WARMING
SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006 (AB 32), at 17 (Nov. 24, 2009) (preliminary draft regulations), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/121409/pdr.pdf; CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, FOREST
PROJECT PROTOCOL, VERSION 3.2, at 61 (Aug. 31, 2010).
67. Personal communication between Laurie Wayburn and C. Best.
68. U.S. ENVT’L. PROT. AGENCY, 430-R-10-006, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2008, at 7-1 (2010).
69. See Rhemtulla, supra note 52, at 6085 (finding that sequestration could be as high as twentyfive or fifty percent in parts of Wisconsin).
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providing greater overall return at the present pricing for carbon.
What are the limits and potential concerns with expanding these
applications of WFCEs? One issue that arises involves private benefits. In
explicitly recognizing these hitherto implicit benefits of conservation easements,
the appraisal issue is raised: Should the benefits accrued by virtue of the
easement be taken into account in the appraisal as values conveyed to the
landowner? If the easement can provide greater regulatory certainty for a
landowner, this is an avoided cost for the landowner, and greater dependability
of income. This represents a value, even if indirect. Should this be appraised? Is
it even appraisable?
In the case of application relevant to the ESA, there is no direct financial
benefit received by the granting of incidental-take permission based largely
upon the terms of the conservation easement. The easement provides
compensation to the landowner that is based on the appraised fair market value
of the restrictions themselves. In other instances of granting an incidental-take
permit with standard restrictions on management, there would be no
compensation on an individual basis for the actions concerned. However, under
the easement, these restrictions are permanent, causing a clear distinction
between the actions under an incidental-take permit versus under an easement.
Additionally, under these easements, there is no “return to baseline,” as there
would be under a typical permit granted under a Safe Harbor Agreement.
Further, the easement has broader performance requirements for habitat
restoration; again a clear distinction from typical habitat conservation plans or
Safe Harbor Agreements.
Does working collaboratively to expand the use of conservation easements
that encourage recovery on private lands pose any concerns for the USFWS?
Does it pose any concerns if easements are acquired with public funds,
especially federal funds? Is the government providing unjust compensation to
landowners to simply follow the requirements of the ESA? Although this
question was raised on several occasions, the answer is clearly no. Three major
distinctions between following the ESA requirements and implementing
permanent conservation easements are noted above: (1) the easement must
stand on its own merits; (2) the easements must benefit the overall
Conservation Values of the property, such as its ecosystem services, and habitat
values as well as any individual species; and (3) the easements must address
clearly delineated public policy goals, preferably at the local, state and federal
level that are pertinent to ensuring broad public value. Equally, the Harbor
permit stands on its own by both incorporating easement terms and adding
several specific restrictions solely concerning the Northern Spotted Owl.
This application of WFCEs could be broadened to create a template
easement restoring and maintaining both habitats for the Northern Spotted Owl
and long-term sustainable forestry that can be tailored to a variety of
conditions. Additionally, there is a potential application of easements to
underpin broader agreements for suites of species that rely on the older, more-
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natural forests that these easements foster, rather than their use in a species-byspecies approach.
Some parties have questioned the applicability of using WFCEs to underpin
the use of forests to reduce carbon emissions. There have been questions of
what was gained between the agreement of the WFCE and the agreements
required for carbon-emissions reductions or CRTs. On the one hand,
landowners receive compensation for the conservation easement based on the
foregone harvest and development rights. On the other hand, they receive
payments for CRTs based on the carbon embodied in avoided depletion of the
forest, increased total volumes of carbon maintained in the forest, and avoided
conversion of the forest. If public funding supported the easements, some argue
that the public should own the carbon that is stored as a result of the easement
requirements. Had easements remained a requirement for carbon-emissions
reductions, this argument could well have prevailed based on a quid pro quo
approach. In other words, the landowner would had been paid twice for the
same conservation easement: once to purchase the easement that created these
CRTs, and again for the CRTs themselves. This would be a “double-dip.”
However, absent the requirement for a conservation easement, the
landowner is voluntarily electing to undertake an easement, as well as all the
other requirements of a carbon-emissions-reductions project. The CRT value
has not been appraised and specific actions required to create CRTs are not
specified under the easement as a restriction. Further, the easements cover far
more than the CRT projects alone, addressing protection of overall
conservation values of the property, clearly differentiating the two agreements.
Additionally, under normal usages of conservation easements, the public does
not own the right to actively use any of the easement rights per se; these rest
with the land trust as negative rights. Landowners must also willingly and
explicitly assign these rights as restricted or forgone to the land trust in the
agreement. Any rights not specifically identified remain with the landowner.
Absent such agreement by landowners, which is likely only when direct
compensation is involved, the legal basis for asserting ownership by the public is
likely tenuous. This, however, remains an area of debate in continued
development of carbon-emissions-reduction projects on forests conserved in
part or whole with public funding.
In this latter case, the overarching issue of distinct and additive payments
for ecosystem services is the underlying question. When an easement is
purchased for a piece of forest that has multiple public benefits—water quality
and quantity, scenery, habitat, recreation, and the forest itself—the appraisal is
based largely on the two main financial values of that easement—timber and
development. Over the last decade we have seen a significant rise in the interest
of developing additional payments for landowners to provide these other public
benefits. It has been argued that each and every benefit should be paid for as if
separable and functional from the system itself. WFCEs, which address the
overall ecosystem function, benefit from these values but do not pay for them.

7 WAYBURN_PAGINATED

Fall 2011]

10/4/2011

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AS TOOLS

197

Given that easements are paying for negative—rather than affirmative rights—
landowners who engage in active management to restore beneficial values have
every right to derive financial benefit there from. Further, as easements extend
the desired impact of regulations well beyond the limits of command and
control regulation, they merit public support to achieve those multiple values.
They are also serving as a highly credible, functional, and robust market for
ecosystem services on which more can be built.
VI
CONCLUSION
Regulatory responses to harm public-trust resources have focused on halting
direct harm to specific resources, rather than addressing the drivers of that
harm. In many cases, the drivers of that harm are based in overarching
ecosystem impacts of resource management and require solutions that address
both the ecosystem itself and the root causes of the management which has
caused harm, and not only changes to the management itself. WFCEs provide a
complementary tool to regulatory responses to prevent or diminish harm of
forest wildlife, habitat, and global climate. As an incentive-based tool, they
provide direct financial compensation to compete with the financial rewards of
resource depletion. Initial application of WFCEs to supplement regulatory
responses to both listed-species protection and climate degradation has proven
positive and worthy of expanded use.

